A classic tale of a falling knife.
QVC’s revenue fell from $14bn in 2020 to $9bn in 2025, as the number of viewers kept dropping. That is a steep decline after a stunning run of almost 40 years. QVC got acquired by famous John Malone’s Liberty Media in 2003 and spun off in 2018, and in 2026 it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The television broadcasting network promoting products from house and garden equipment to clothes under the promise of Quality, Value and Convenience (QVC) for the couch-sitting public succumbed to the heavy debt burden and decreasing revenue. Seemingly a classic case of a falling knife, but can their competitive advantage tap into a undeveloped market?
The restructuring, in which the creditors took full control of the company with its newly issued 50 million shares while holding most of the board seats, was completed in August 2026. Their new (interim) CEO Mike George, a QVC veteran who ran the enterprise for almost 16 years until 2021, inherits the “WIN Strategy”, which was initiated in November 2024 under his predecessor, and has said he will build on it. The group has been relieved of $5.3bn of debt. It still has to service the remaining $1.3bn at 10% interest, against a market capitalisation of roughly $900m, revenue of almost $4bn in the first half of 2026 and a negative cash flow of $145m. Nevertheless, the underlying structure of the business might create an opportunity for QVC to become a strong player in the live shopping industry, which is around $20bn in North America and has 50% YoY growth. The road still seems rather bumpy with vastly deteriorating financials.
Catch it when you can
QVC shopping is a bit more than just trying to sell you your new sixpack with their Ab Rocker. With their current demographic of women over 50 who are spending over $1,400 each, they are incredibly sticky (about 97% of sales come from repeat customers) and convert more than 10 million unique customers each year. Although the era of broadcast couch buying might be over, the curation and sourcing of products, negotiated product deals, vendor partnerships, conversion expertise, host development, production capacity, and brand trust might be their true strengths in the age of live shopping. This model with accurate targeting would need to pivot from a direct distribution, payment, and fulfilment platform towards a dependency on external social platforms. These platforms have a low barrier to entry and, together with affordable high-quality production tools, create a competitor base QVC has never faced before. More importantly, QVC’s demographic must shift as the penetration seems rather low and undeveloped on these platforms. They have a higher household income and are more profitable than the highly impulsive Gen Z-driven Temu shoppers who are abundantly active on those social shopping platforms.
Now that attention is rapidly moving to other distribution channels such as Netflix, Prime, YouTube, Whatnot and TikTok, a recovery is required to make up for the loss of the previous advantage. While the previously mentioned strengths must not be underestimated, a stronger positioning should be developed to avoid margin compression from the flood of competitors. Several external forces will put pressure on their positioning, with the ever-changing algorithms, low barrier to entry, and existing fulfilment networks that single star hosts can tap into.
A positive signal came from the acquisition of roughly 1 million new customers in 2025 through TikTok and the round-the-clock live stream launched there in April of that year, which shows a potential recovery under the flag of another attention platform.
“I wait until an investment idea is so good, it hits me over the head like an anvil.”
– Joel Greenblatt
Live opportunity
Most successful live shopping channels in China ride on the success of a single star host. QVC’s game has been the opposite: it utilises many famous hosts and guides them through a scripted sales process. This serves different customers with different hosts and a variety of products, backed by the back office (returns and customer support), while creating a layer of consistent brand trust. A single star host can leave or lose appeal, and the audience goes with them. When QVC replaces a host, the system around the host stays in place. These differentiators affect the product promotions during all hours of the day.
QVC has the flexibility to A/B test conversions across product categories and demographics, while utilising different types of hosts for a continuous 24/7 stream of offerings. Their previous total addressable market was rather slim compared to the undeveloped live commerce potential in North America. The Chinese live commerce market, although slightly differently structured, has a market size of roughly $900bn (2025), and US e-commerce is a $1.2tn market that is exposed to live shopping. Apart from QVC itself, there is no prominent publicly listed player pursuing this market exhaustively.
Hit the spots
There are major assumptions to take into consideration. A shift towards live shopping is currently in the making, but real numbers have to show whether this is sustainable and a strong pursuit. They would need to be able to tap into other demographics as their current demographic is spread thin on these platforms. The decline in viewers is unexplained so far, and it is unclear whether QVC is losing them to these new platforms or to cord-cutting, or whether QVC has lost its way to entice new customers, or a combination of these. The loss of customers in one distribution channel could be a great pain that moves QVC into an opportunity. Forced to venture out into a multi-channel approach, QVC would execute the playbook on multiple platforms, expanding into different target markets and thus addressing a larger market. This alone creates a considerable opportunity with their expertise. The current ongoing telesales business could cover the potential of a downside if the drop in users flattens. All things considered, several aspects must go right for it to become a high-flying company in the live commerce space, which makes it too risky for a serious allocation at this time. We particularly like companies with high predictability and a clear moat. At this point, we can not find their margins, returns, nor negotiated platform fees that can anticipate any potential success.
Our view
The live commerce industry is highly ranked on our radar. For us, it seems that the industry is not yet developed in the West, which creates an opportunity. Although loyalty on those platforms is rather low and buying is trend-driven, a business that understands these aspects deeply can align its economics and operations accordingly. Looking at QVC’s current position, the lack of live commerce information, and the assumptions, we do not see this as a sure play. Nevertheless, it shows that this business could well be a prominent player in a large undeveloped market across categories.
The way we think about QVC is by asking what it keeps once television stops mattering. It keeps a customer base that trusts its brand and its hosts, plus a system of curation, vendor deals and back-office support that produces that trust and should work on any screen. The money side is less comfortable, as the remaining $1.3bn at 10% interest has to be paid by a business with negative cash flow, so the equity only pays off if the play works well on the new platforms. Therefore, we patiently wait for confirmation of our assumptions. The potential upside is high, and although the valuation looks attractive, there is no margin of safety to catch the falling knife.
Disclaimer: This publication is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute personalised investment advice, nor an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security. It reflects the author’s opinions, estimates and analysis as of the date of publication, based on information believed to be reliable but not guaranteed for accuracy or completeness. Investing involves risk, including the loss of capital. The author may hold positions in the securities discussed; any material positions, compensation or other conflicts of interest will be disclosed in the relevant publication. Readers should conduct their own research and reach their own investment decisions.
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